What possessed Britain to attempt to subordinate a primitive, desolate country that was trapped in the Middle Ages? How was it possible that a third rate force could massacre 17 000 British soldiers with only ten survivors – a surgeon and an officers wife amongst them? This defeat even exceeded that against the Zulus at Isandlwana in Natal.
The country in question is Afghanistan, a country wedged precariously between two expanding Empires – the Russian and the British. The Russians under the Tsars during the nineteenth century were rapidly expanding eastward towards Alaska whereas the British were initially content on the Indian subcontinent.
Main picture: Alexander Burnes – Scottish explorer and adventurers & fluent Persian speaker
Arising from mutual suspicious of each other’s intentions in the mountainous regions abutting both their Empires, each became engrossed in what was ultimately to become known as The Great Game. This term was used to describe the strategic rivalry between the British and the Russian Empires for supremacy in Central Asia from approximately 1813 to 1907.
Area of Operations – First Anglo Afghan War
Central to the initial intelligence regarding this barren inaccessible part of the world, was a Scottish explorer, traveller and adventurer by the name of Alexander Burnes. Being fluent in both Hindi and Persian, fascinated by the local cultures and sensitive to the religious and social traditions and customs, he rapidly ingratiated himself with the local dignitaries.
Burnes traversed across Afghanistan via Kabul – or Cabool as Burnes refers to it – and ultimately reached Bukhara in modern day Uzbekistan in 1831. On his return to England in 1934 he published a travelogue which became an instant success. The fact that Burnes had encountered a Russian explorer en route was sufficient to arouse the British suspicions as to his purpose. He was quickly labelled as a Russian spy reconnoitring the “unclaimed” land between the Empires.
Major Brydon
In spite of the Russian intentions being knowingly exaggerated, wise counsel cautioned against precipitate action. It did not prevail. An invasion of Afghanistan was mandated.
The Russian Empire was gradually extending its domain into Central Asia, and this was seen as an encroachment south that might prove fatal for the British Company in India.
Afghanistan’s Emir, Dost Mohammad Khan, was caught between a number of fires. In the North East, Dost Mohammad had recently lost Afghanistan’s second capital of Peshawar to the Sikh Empire. In the west with Russian support, the Qajar Dynasty of Persia, attempted to besiege Herat but relented when Britain threatened war.
Emir Dost Mohammad Khan
Politics again encroached on rational decision making. With the arrival of the Russian envoy Yan Vitkevich in Kabul, the political advisers of the Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland, exaggerated the threat that Dost Mohammad would turn to Russia for support.
A British Army of 21 000 men set out in December 1838. In April 1939 they captured the City of Kandahar which was the main American and British base during the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. Finally they set off for Kabul which was duly captured. The Emir, Dost Mohammad fled to be replaced by a pro-British Emir, Shuja Shah Durrani. Initially this arrangement appeared to work but anger arose at Shuja for being irresolute, pro-British and corrupt. Even the indefatigable Alexander Burnes was unaware of the resentment simmering within the local populace.
Ghanzi Fort being attacked
Two fateful decisions would be the death knell of the British. Most of the British forces in Kabul had been consigned to duties elsewhere and only 8 000 remained. To placate the remaining British troops, their wives in India were allowed to join them in Afghanistan. To the Afghanis, this gave the appearance of a permanent British settlement.
Even more disconcerting from a defensive point of view, was the decision to relocate from the fortress of Bala Hissar to a cantonment built on the north east of Kabul. Whoever designed this fortification did not take into account a number of basic military requirements. The chosen location was indefensible as hills on all sides overlooked it. To make matters worse, the cantonment was too large for the number of troops camped in it and had a defensive perimeter almost two miles long. Finally just to ensure that it could never withstand a siege, the stores and supplies were located in a separate fort some 300 metres from the main cantonment.
The ultimate spark which ignited the conflagration was the accusation that the British troops were “interfering” with Afghani women. Their first target was Alexander Burnes himself who resided in the town itself.
Taking no heed of the warnings of his Afghani servants, Burnes remained in his lodgings. With his masterful command of the Persian language and his rapport with the Afghani people, he ignored their admonitions to depart. Burnes licentious behaviour made him the target of the mob’s wrath. With his perfect Persian diction, Burnes attempted to reason with the enraged mob. They were implacable. Donning a head scarf, he attempted to escape from an adjacent rooftop to no avail. The mob caught him and decapitated him.
Alexander Burnes pleading for clemency with an enraged mob in Kabul
According to Wikipedia:
In the following weeks the British commanders tried to negotiate with Akbar Khan. Macnaghten secretly offered to make Akbar Afghanistan’s vizier in exchange for allowing the British to stay, while simultaneously disbursing large sums of money to have him assassinated, which was reported to Akbar Khan.] A meeting for direct negotiations between Macnaghten and Akbar was held near the cantonment on 23 December, but Macnaghten and the three officers accompanying him were seized and slain by Akbar Khan.
In the face of the Afghani reneging on an agreement, the British Commander, Elphinstone, acceded to Shuja’s demand that they would be provided safe passage out of Afghanistan subject to their leaving all their heavy weapons behind in the cantonment. The logic for the acceptance of this imprudent decision was probably based upon the indefensibility of the cantonment itself.
The final stand
It was to prove to be a Faustian Bargain for the British.
Five days later, the withdrawal began. The departing British contingent numbered around 16,500, of which about 4,500 were military personnel, and over 12,000 were camp followers. The military force consisted mostly of Indian units and one British battalion, 44th Regiment of Foot.
It was an arduous journey. With limited food supplies and inadequate protection against the cold and snow, many died during the night.
On the third day, the Afghanis reneged on their safe passage agreement. From both sides of the treacherous gorges and passes, the Afghanis rained bullets down onto the exposed troops and their dependents. These gorges stretched all the way along the Kabul River to Gandamak. The final bunch of 44 survivors was massacred at the Gandamak pass. One solitary survivor, a Dr William Brydon, was the only person to reach their destination, Jalalabad with only another surviving bit were taken prisoner.
The Sole Survivor Dr Brydon reaches Jalalabad
In retribution, the British stormed into Kabul, raised the Kasbah to the ground and departed Afghanistan, having proved that they were invincible.
16 500 people had died in the vain attempt to escape from Kabul and ten survived.
Surely the worse defeat by the British ever, even against a first rate force!
Treachery and atrocious weather conditions can be attributed as the major reasons for the calamity.
Nonetheless the fact remains that a defeat of monumental proportions was inflicted upon the British. 
Sources:
Primary: Afghanistan: The Great Game by Rory Steward
Secondary: Wikipedia