From a purely military perspective – both strategic and tactical – and a personal bravery standpoint, Rommel had few peers during WW2 except perhaps for George Patton. In other aspects there were contradictions and these behaviours and actions were not so unambiguous as to be able to categorise Rommel’s viewpoint one way or the other. This blog will not focus on his military accomplishments as these have been extensively dealt with but rather these other aspects of his life.
One of the issues which has always intrigued me is at what point did Rommel decide to support the plot to assassinate Hitler. What was Rommel’s relationship with his men? Was it as Goebbels had portrayed it in his propaganda films as collegial or not? Was Rommel a committed Nazi or was he, as he claims, an apolitical military officer? Lastly when did Rommel finally become disillusioned with Hitler?
Main picture: Rommel with the 15th Panzer Division in North Africa
Apart from Goebbels who kept an extensive diary, Rommel was the only other high ranking person in the Third Reich on whom we have such a wonderful insight into what he thought at that moment in time. Besides extensive notes and letters to “My darling Lu” – his wife – we have the various interviews with his son who later in life became Lord Mayor of Stuttgart. It appears that despite his tender age of 17 when his father was forced to commit suicide by Hitler by taking cyanide, Rommel had kept Manfred apprised of the situation. All of these sources provide us with an extensive insight into the mind of Erwin Rommel.
Nonetheless, there are many questions which I would love to be able to address to Rommel. The one that has most troubled me and one that I have pondered at great length was why did he meekly agree to take the cyanide capsule given to him on 14th October 1944? Was it an act of cowardice because he did not wish to be tortured? Perhaps it was rather his ingrained deference to authority which did not permit him to object. This is supported by one of his final comments about “always loving Hitler.” Finally it is more likely than not that his submissive behaviour was a subterfuge to protect his family who were present when he was arrested. His final words to them were “I might not see you for a long time” indicate that he was aware of what his fate would be but nevertheless he attempted to spare their feelings.
Rommel’s utterances in support of Hitler immediately prior to his death and the manner of his death is reminiscent of the execution of Anne Boleyn 308 years earlier on 19th May 1736 where she was also afforded the dignity of a private execution. Like Rommel, she too would not even in her final hour speak ill of Henry VIII but uttering these famous words, “But I pray God save the king and send him long to reign over you, for a gentler nor a more merciful prince was there never: and to me he was ever a good, a gentle and sovereign lord.” Like Anne Boleyn’s comments, I find Rommel’s remark equally anomalous. If he was so disgusted at Hitler’s rule, why did he not rather remain silent?
Rommel is regarded as having been a humane and professional officer. Whenever Rommel was issued with instructions which conflicted with his moral code, he treated them with disdain not openly and thus throwing caution to the wind but by merely ignoring them. The first such occasion arose when the Afrika Korps was facing the Free French forces stationed at Bir Hakeim at the southernmost tip of the Gazala Line. Hitler issued an infamous instruction that as the French has entered into an entente with the Germans, these were rebels and renegades. As such they were not to be accorded the status as POWs on capture, but that they had to be executed as mutineers. Rommel eschewed this command and in fact never relayed it to his subordinates.
Nowhere is the effect of this irrational order on Rommel elucidated. From my viewpoint, the fact that Rommel chose to ignore a command by his supreme commander, is indicative of his opposition to it. This was the first command that Rommel was to ignore. Was it not the beginning of the process of questioning Hitler’s authority? I imagine so.
The next time when Rommel was to countermand one of Hitler’s orders would be without precedent and would forever sour the relationship between him and Hitler. This occasion arose during the battle of El-Alamein. By this point in the war, the decoders in Bletchley Park in England were able to decipher the encoded messages within a few hours of their transmission. Montgomery was the first Allied General who was able to take advantage of these transcripts. This permitted Montgomery to adjust his plans on the fly.
At a point during the late evening on 2nd November 1942, Operation Supercharge had made significant progress against the German to the extent that a breakthrough was imminent. In this dire situation, Rommel issued an instruction to his forces to commence an immediate withdrawal. Hitler’s Head Quarters in Rastenburg in East Prussia was informed. On receipt of this communication in the morning, Hitler issued two instructions: (1) halt the withdrawal forthwith and hold the positions to the last man (2) execute Major Morner [at Rastenburg] for receiving the message.
Rommel was in a quandary. He was unwilling to sacrifice his beloved Afrika Korps to such an inane instruction but his ingrained sense of duty forbade any deviation from the terse instruction. Finally his unwavering belief in the correctness of his initial decision, he did the utterly inconceivable: he countermanded Hitler’s order & re-commenced the retreat. Hitler was fuming. He uttered disparaging remarks to his entourage about the unreliable generals. Rommel’s goose had been well and truly cooked. In fact it was overcooked and spoilt. Never again would Hitler ever trust this Bavarian Generalfeldmarschall again.
In the case of Stalingrad the stakes a month later were even higher; the lives of 200 000 men. Yet what did Paulus do? He adhered stringently to Hitler’s mindlessly stupid decision not to breakout. Based on a similar scenario the previous winter when the German forces had been surrounded at Demyansk, he believed that the Luftwaffe could supply a force many times larger from the air based upon Goering’s assurances.
This begs the question of what would have happened if Paulus had ignored that order & withdrawn back 250 kms thereby saving the lives of 200 000 German soldiers? Prior to this, Paulus had been a backroom general without fighting experience. As such this could be rated as equivalent to a Des Van Rooyen as South Africa’s finance minister or General Percival as commander of the British forces at Singapore. Unlike Rommel, Paulus’ fate would have been execution by firing squad due to dereliction of duty.
As Rommel was to confide to wife Lucia – Lu to Rommel – this decision was the most tumultuous period of his life. I could well believe that. Perhaps insufficient recognition is given for this episode in his life but I rate it exceptionally highly. It certainly highlights his mental fortitude.
The fact that Hitler never relieved Rommel of his command is indicative to me that Hitler was mindful of Rommel’s ability. Another factor which probably stood Rommel in good stead was an arcane one. Unlike other Generals, Goebbels had long portrayed Rommel as the quintessential German hero in his propaganda newsreels. This weighed heavily in Hitler’s scheme for his future deployment.
The 50 day 1800km withdrawal across Egypt and Libya to Tunisia gave Rommel pause to reflect on what had happened. Most of the people closest to him such as his driver claim that he was a changed man – distracted and distant. Any such devastating loss could be predicted to result in maudlin and disconsolate thoughts but was not Rommel also questioning the competence of Hitler as well at the same time?
As regards his relationship with the common soldier, was there any rapport and empathy? Undoubtedly his troops held him in high regard and, unlikely as it should be, so did the Allied soldiers. More telling than holding somebody distant from one in high regard, it the manner in which that person treats subordinates in one-on-one interactions which is indicative of their attitude. This is the true arbiter of whether they possess EQ. This never implies that one must be “soft” on one’s subordinates but more whether one treats them with respect.
In spite of Goebbels portraying Rommel as a soldiers’ general, in reality he was not. Many of the lower ranks in daily contacts with him such as his driver do not regard him in such a positive light. Lest anyone takes this as berating Rommel, I would classify his attitude to his immediate subordinates as distant rather than obnoxious.
Ironically even though Hitler had issued the order not to retreat, Rommel did not place the blame on Hitler himself. Tellingly he shifted the blame onto the OKW – Jodl and Keitel – and Hitler’s cronies such as Goering. Rommel was unable to discern Hitler’s true character. Much like the survivors of Stalin’s purges, they would never attribute their denunciation and subsequent banishment to a gulag to the culprit Stalin but to his ignoramus subordinates. So too it was with Rommel.
Such were the ramifications of the deteriorating military situation after El-Alamein and Stalingrad that Rommel’s belief in final victory had been eroded to such an extent that whilst he was Commander of Army Group B in France, he raised his concerns with Hitler in person. It is alleged that Hitler conceded the point that victory was impossible but did not address the issue of any alternatives. This was left unanswered.
Bereft of options Rommel was forced to confide in fellow generals about his concerns. The only realistic option as they understood it was that Hitler had to be assassinated. This Rommel would not accede to. Was this Rommel’s political naivety being exposed? This is the only logical explanation. Being a soldier he had not fully understood the full ramifications of a dictatorship. Sole power resided in Hitler. In order for change to occur, the head of the regime had to be decapitated.
Rommel’s naivety displayed itself in other ways too. Rommel approached SS General Sepp Dietrich who was in command of the 1st SS Panzer Corps in the Battle of Normandy. He enquired whether Sepp, a confidant of Hitler from the Putsch days, whether he would join a conspiracy to kill Hitler. Sepp reputedly stated that he would if ordered to.
As far as I can ascertain, Rommel never actually formally joined the conspiracy against Hitler but having supported the aims and objectives of the conspirators, he was held to be equally culpable.
As such Hitler demanded that he commit suicide.
Rommel dutifully did so a few hours later on 14th October 1944.
In the purely military sphere Rommel was unrivalled. But whether he was a good Nazi cannot be determined. When he was offered a flat in Berlin of an evicted Jewish family, he declined it. Even when Strauling, a subordinate officer, confirmed the existence of the gas chambers to Rommel, he never used that information in any way.
Perhaps I being too harsh on Rommel as like many people living in a dictatorship, they are totally conflicted. Like Angela Merkl living under the Communists in East Germany, her family rapidly learnt that only unobtrusive forms of resistance could be performed. This would account for Rommel’s seemingly inconsistent behaviour. In one instance, he did not adhere to Hitler’s instruction not to retreat and yet never raised with Hitler his concerns about the extermination of the Jews. This is viewpoint on this inconsistency. In the former case the issue was in the military domain where Rommel was confident of his standing whereas in the latter case it was in the political sphere where as a soldier he was unsure of himself and treading on dangerous ground.
Instead Rommel, like the rest of the German population, would not intrude on the social and political.
Like many others, Rommel was a child of his time and, as such, a man of manifold contradictions.